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SUZANNA SHERRY

H O G S G E T S L A U G H T E R E D AT T H E
S U P R E M E C O U RT

Class action plaintiffs lost two major ﬁve-to-four cases last Term.
Both will potentially have a signiﬁcant negative impact on future
litigation. The tragedy is that the impact of each of these cases
might well have been avoided had the plaintiffs’ lawyers, the lower
courts, and the dissenting Justices not overreached. In this article,
I show that the losing side insisted on broad and untenable positions
and thereby set itself up for an equally broad defeat. Whether described in the poker vernacular of this essay’s title1 or, in a more
cultured phrasing, as hubris—in its original meaning of tempting
the gods—the losing side got greedy and suffered the inevitable
consequences. Unfortunately, in these cases, the consequences will
redound to the detriment of many other potential litigants.
And these two cases are not isolated tragedies; they provide a
window into a larger problem. Rule 23 turns class counsel into
Suzanna Sherry is Herman O. Loewenstein Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University
Law School.
Author’s note: I thank Lisa Bressman, Brian Fitzpatrick, Maria Glover, and Jay Tidmarsh for their helpful comments. Matt Meltzer provided excellent research assistance.
This article was inspired by my late colleague, Richard Nagareda, from whom I learned
so much. He will be missed.
1
In poker, the expression is used to describe players with potentially winning hands
who get too greedy and take risks that ultimately cause them to lose. Although the idiom
has broader currency than at the poker table, it is a common sentiment there and is
especially apt for a game in which players have a choice about exactly how much to risk
at any given time. See Larry W. Phillips, The Tao of Poker: 285 Rules to Transform Your
Game and Your Life 118 (Adams Media, 2003) (Rule 162, attributing it to a poker-room
saying).
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powerful private attorneys general and tempts them to raise the
stakes. It allows plaintiffs’ lawyers to chart a course not only for
their own clients, but for future litigants. If that course is ill-advised—as it is when the lawyers have incentives, as they often do,
to frame issues broadly for the “big win”—the consequences can
be disastrous for those future litigants. What this Term’s cases demonstrate is that because we are unlikely to change the incentives of
class counsel, we must instead focus on their ability to frame the
issues. It is up to the courts, and especially to the judges most
sympathetic to the interests of current and future class-action plaintiffs, to avoid the costs of lawyers’ overreaching. That is exactly
what the dissenting Justices (and the judges below) failed to do.
I begin with a discussion of AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion,2 in
which the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the enforceability of a contract in which consumers simultaneously agreed
to arbitration and waived classwide arbitration. It seems likely that
most consumer contracts will now contain such a clause, and classwide consumer actions—whether litigation or arbitration—will all
but disappear.3 I then turn to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v Dukes,4 in
which the Court again reversed the Ninth Circuit, ﬁnding that a
class consisting of all current and former female Wal-Mart employees should not have been certiﬁed. The likely effect of WalMart is not as certain as that of AT&T Mobility, but there is a good
possibility that the case will result in a ratcheting up of requirements
for class certiﬁcation and thus in fewer class actions, especially in
the context of employment discrimination. I conclude by returning
to the larger question of the appropriate judicial response to lawyers’
overreaching.
2

131 S Ct 1740 (2011).

3

See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, and Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts,
41 U Mich J L Ref 871, 882–83 (2008) (observing that 80% of ﬁnancial services and
telecommunications consumer contracts contained class waivers in 2008). Professor Myriam Gilles predicted the “near-total demise” of the class action, partly because of contractual arbitration clauses, before the litigation in AT&T Mobility even commenced. Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class
Action, 104 Mich L Rev 373 (2005). More recently—after AT&T Mobility—she has written
that “most class action cases will not survive the impending tsunami of class action waivers.”
Myriam Gilles and Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U Chi L Rev (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstractp1928071.
4
131 S Ct 2541 (2011). All nine Justices concurred in the result, and agreed on one
ground for reversal. But on the most signiﬁcant issue in the case—and the focus of this
article—four Justices dissented.
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I. AT&T Mobility v Concepcion
In AT&T Mobility, the majority reached the right result but
for the wrong reasons. In this section, I suggest that different decisions by the plaintiffs’ lawyers, the Ninth Circuit judges, or the
dissenting Justices might have led to a narrower and less harmful
opinion. I begin by describing and criticizing the majority’s broad
approach, and then turn to justifying the outcome of the case on
narrower grounds.
a. the majority’s broad approach
Both the facts and the law in AT&T Mobility made the plaintiffs’
case unappealing. The Concepcions bought a phone from the
defendant that had been advertised as “free,” but were then
charged about $30 in taxes that state law required defendants to
collect. The Concepcions challenged this as fraudulent advertising, a claim that in itself evokes images of litigation run amok—
it is not as if AT&T Mobility (ATTM) could have declined to
collect the tax. Nevertheless, they were entitled to make the claim,
and to force ATTM to respond.
But it is how the plaintiffs went about making the claim that led
to the disastrous Supreme Court decision. The standard ATTM
contract, signed by all phone purchasers, provided for arbitration
of all disputes and mandated individual rather than classwide arbitration. The plaintiffs5 nevertheless ﬁled a putative class action
in federal court—on behalf of all consumers who had purchased
a “free” or discounted phone as part of a “bundled” transaction—
against ATTM,6 raising various statutory and common-law California claims. The defendant moved to compel individual arbitration under the contract.
Plaintiffs’ response to the motion to compel arbitration is the
crux of the case: They argued that the class-arbitration waiver was
unconscionable under California law and therefore unenforce-

5
The Concepcions’ complaint was consolidated with a putative class action ﬁled by
other plaintiffs, which had originally been ﬁled in state court and removed to federal court
by the defendant. See Laster v AT&T Mobility, 584 F3d 849, 853 (9th Cir 2009).
6
The original defendant was Cingular Wireless, which was acquired by AT&T and
renamed. See id at 852 n 1.
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able.7 If (but only if) the waiver provision was unconscionable,
then the courts had to decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) preempts state-law doctrines of unconscionability.
The relevant substantive provision of the FAA is § 2, which
provides:
A written provision in any . . . [commercial] contract . . . to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . .
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.8

Section 2 effectively embodies an implied preemption directive
and an explicit savings clause wrapped into one. The Court has
frequently reiterated that the FAA manifests a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.”9 To the extent that state law stands as
an obstacle to this federal goal, it is preempted. But state laws that
are generally applicable to all contracts—that is, grounds that “exist in law or equity for the revocation of any contract”—are saved
from preemption.
Unconscionability, of course, is a general doctrine applicable to
all contracts. The clear language of § 2 therefore suggests that
the FAA does not preempt the invalidation of an arbitration clause
found to be unconscionable, because the invalidation rests on
grounds that exist for “the revocation of any contract.” If contracts
without arbitration clauses are sometimes found to be unconscionable—as of course they are—then unconscionability should fall
within the savings clause. And, indeed, both the district court and
the Ninth Circuit, after concluding that the class-arbitration
waiver was unconscionable under California law, found no preemption.
A majority of the Supreme Court disagreed. To be fair, the Court
was in something of a bind. If ATTM’s carefully constructed ar7
The contract also contained a “blow-up” clause, declaring that if the class-arbitration
ban were to be found unenforceable, the entire arbitration clause would be “null and void”
and any class action would be litigated in court. Invalidation of the class-arbitration waiver
thus effectively invalidated the arbitration clause. Brief for Respondent, AT&T Mobility
LLC v Concepcion, Civil Action No 109-893, *3 (S Ct ﬁle, Sept 29, 2010) (“Respondent’s
Brief ”).
8

9 USC § 2.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury Construction Corp., 460 US 1, 24 (1983);
see also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v Cardegna, 546 US 440, 443 (2006) (noting that FAA
embodies “national policy favoring arbitration”).
9
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bitration clause is invalid,10 then no waiver of classwide arbitration
will ever be valid. Given the strong pro-arbitration policy of the
FAA—aggressively enforced by the Court in recent years11—as
well as the legitimate reasons for a company to prefer one-on-one
arbitration even if it is not trying to escape liability,12 invalidating
all waivers of classwide arbitration no matter the circumstances is
probably not the right result. The majority, however, did more
than simply uphold the particular arbitration clause. Adopting a
breathtakingly broad view of implied preemption, the Court held
that “requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes
with the fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a
scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”13
The Court’s analysis is vulnerable to several criticisms. First,
the Court’s reading of § 2 turns preemption doctrine on its head.
In determining whether a federal statute preempts state law, the
touchstone is always congressional intent. Moreover, federalism
concerns dictate a presumption against preemption: “In all preemption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has
‘legislated . . . in a ﬁeld which the States have traditionally occupied,’ we ‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”14
In the absence of either an express statutory statement preempting state law or unequivocal evidence that Congress intended
to preempt state law, the Court looks at whether the state law in
question would interfere with the purposes and objectives of the
federal statute. That is a questionable endeavor, as several Justices
have noted, because it is “potentially boundless.”15 This type of
10
See text accompanying notes 42– 46 for an analysis of the special features of ATTM’s
arbitration clause.
11
For a discussion of this trend, see Gilles, 104 Mich L Rev at 393–96 (cited in note
3). The trend has continued. See, for example, Stolt-Nielsen SA v AnimalFeeds International
Corp., 130 S Ct 1758 (2010); Rent-a-Center West v Jackson, 130 S Ct 2772 (2010).
12

See text accompanying notes 55–68 for a discussion of these reasons.

13

131 S Ct at 1748.

14

Medtronic Inc. v Lohr, 518 US 470, 485 (1996) (citation omitted), quoting Rice v Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 US 218, 230 (1947). See also Wyeth v Levine, 129 S Ct 1187, 1195
n 3 (2009); Altria Group, Inc. v Good, 555 US 70, 76 (2008); Bates v Dow Agrosciences LLC,
544 US 431, 449 (2005).
15
Geier v American Honda Motor Co., 529 US 861, 907 (2000) (Stevens, J, dissenting);
see also Wyeth v Levine, 129 S Ct at 1207 (Thomas, J, concurring in judgment); Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v Walsh, 538 US 644, 678 (2003) (Thomas,
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implied preemption should therefore be cabined—and rare—even
for statutes that contain no savings clause. But the AT&T Mobility
majority went even further than ordinary purposes-and-objectives
implied preemption: It found such preemption in the face of an
express savings clause. Only once before—and in a much narrower
context—has the Court ever overridden an express savings clause
by ﬁnding implied preemption.16 Doing so is inconsistent with
both the presumption against preemption and the goal of implementing congressional intent.
Second, the Court read into the FAA a particular approach to
implied preemption that is inconsistent with the statutory language. The FAA saves from preemption “such grounds as exist
. . . for the revocation of any contract.” The AT&T Mobility majority recognized that California unconscionability law applies
equally to waivers of class arbitration and waivers of class litigation,
and is thus “a doctrine normally thought to be generally applicable.”17 It nevertheless concluded that even a generally applicable
state-law doctrine is preempted if it is “applied in a fashion that
disfavors arbitration.”18
The majority gave as examples of laws “applied in a fashion that
disfavors arbitration” hypothetical state laws conditioning enforceability of arbitration clauses on the availability of judicially monitored discovery or on the application of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, and found the availability of classwide arbitration to be
similar.19 These examples—as well as the Court’s analysis of how
a requirement of class arbitration interferes with the purposes of
arbitration20—suggest that the majority did not mean to focus on
instances in which state (or federal) courts apply the same doctrines
differentially in cases that involve arbitration clauses and cases that
do not, because all of the examples supplied by the majority (including the classwide arbitration at issue in AT&T Mobility) seem
to assume that the doctrine will be applied equally in all cases.
Instead, the majority seems to have had in mind a concept analJ, concurring in judgment); Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363, 388–91
(2000) (Scalia, J, concurring in judgment).
16

See Geier, 529 US at 861 (2000).

17

131 S Ct at 1747.
Id.

18
19
20

Id at 1747– 48.

Id at 1751–52. For further discussion of that analysis, see text accompanying notes
21–25.
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ogous to disparate impact. Although unconscionability applies
identically in all cases to invalidate certain limitations on classwide
dispute resolution, it disproportionately invalidates arbitration
contracts because they are inherently more likely to run afoul of
the requirements. Similarly, a requirement that all enforceable
contracts provide for the use of discovery or evidence rules will
disproportionately invalidate arbitration contracts. Another way
to put it is to suggest that these sorts of requirements will have
a disparate impact on arbitration generally, by inﬂuencing contracting parties to prefer litigation.
But neither the language nor the purpose of the FAA justiﬁes
importing a disparate impact principle into the savings clause. The
unconscionability principle is a “ground[] . . . for the revocation
of any contract”; its application is not limited, in principle or in
fact, to agreements to arbitrate. As for purposes, the FAA was
enacted primarily to counter state (and federal) hostility to arbitration: “the basic purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to
overcome courts’ refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate.”21 It
therefore should not be read to preempt a neutral state doctrine—
like unconscionability—unless the purpose of that doctrine was to
diminish the enforceability of arbitration clauses. The Court was
mistaken to compare unconscionability to hypothetical state law
requirements that juries be used, that judicially supervised discovery be allowed, or that the Federal Rules of Evidence be followed, because those requirements would be obvious pretexts, designed to prevent arbitration. But there is no evidence that
California’s doctrine of unconscionability was in any way motivated by hostility toward arbitration.
In fact, the ﬁrst case in which a California court found the
unavailability of classwide dispute resolution unconscionable was
America Online, Inc. v Superior Court,22 which involved class actions
rather than class arbitration. The court found the “unavailability
of class action relief . . . in and by itself sufﬁcient to preclude
enforcement” of a consumer contract.23 Four years later, the Cal21

Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v Dobson, 513 US 265, 270 (1995).

22

90 Cal App 4th 1, 108 Cal Rptr 2d 699 (Cal Ct App 2001).

23

90 Cal App 4th at 18, 108 Cal Rptr 2d at 713. The contractual provision at issue
was a forum-selection clause, but because the forum speciﬁed by the contract did not
permit consumer class actions, the court found it to be the “functional equivalent” of a
class-action waiver. 90 Cal App 4th at 5, 108 Cal Rptr 2d at 702.
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ifornia Supreme Court relied in part on America Online when it
held, in Discover Bank v Superior Court, that exculpatory waivers
of either class actions or class arbitration are unconscionable.24
Other California courts have also applied the Discover Bank doctrine to class-action waivers in contracts without arbitration
clauses.25 In light of the absence of any deliberate attempt to disadvantage or limit arbitration contracts, the majority’s holding that
the FAA preempts neutral, generally applicable California unconscionability doctrines because of their effect on arbitration
clauses is a misreading of the federal statute.
Finally, the majority turns its back on a recent, directly relevant
case, without so much as a citation to it. In the course of its
purposes-and-objectives analysis, the majority suggested that classwide arbitration interferes with the goals of the FAA because of
the “fundamental” differences between classwide and bilateral arbitration.26 In particular, the Court reasoned, “class arbitration
greatly increases the risks to defendants” because the “higher
stakes of class litigation” will cause defendants to be “pressured
into settling questionable claims.”27 But just the previous Term,
in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v Allstate Insurance Co.,28 a
majority that included three members of the AT&T Mobility majority held that class litigation did not fundamentally differ from
bilateral litigation. Rejecting the defendant’s argument that allowing class litigation “transform[s] the dispute over a ﬁve hundred
dollar penalty into a dispute over a ﬁve million dollar penalty,” the
Court in Shady Grove described the threat of greater liability as
just an “incidental effect” of the availability of a class action.29 The
24
113 P3d 1100, 1106 – 07, 1108 (2005). The Ninth Circuit ruling reversed by AT&T
Mobility also relied on Discover Bank.
25
See, for example, In re Yahoo! Litigation, 251 FRD 459 (CD Cal 2008); Elhilu v Quiznos
Franchise Co., LLC, No 06-CV-07855 (CD Cal April 3, 2008). Courts in other states have
also refused to enforce class-action waivers (or forum-selection clauses with the same
effect) in nonarbitration cases. See, for example, Dix v ICT Group, Inc., 161 P3d 1016
(Wash 2007); America Online, Inc. v Pasieka, 870 S2d 170 (Fla Ct App 2004).
26

131 S Ct at 1750, quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S Ct at 1776.

27

131 S Ct at 1752. The Court also pointed to the fact that class arbitration might
slow down the dispute-resolution process and the fact that class arbitration requires procedural formality. Id at 1751. As the dissent points out, the Court has previously upheld
state-law requirements that have each of these effects. See id at 1761 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
28

130 S Ct 1431 (2010).
Id at 1443. The Shady Grove plurality—which largely overlapped the AT&T Mobility
majority, with both opinions written by Justice Scalia—may have been concerned about
a possible tension with the Rules Enabling Act, 28 USC § 2072. If bringing claims as a
29
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class action in Shady Grove and class arbitration in AT&T Mobility
both increased the stakes for the defendant in the same way, creating what the latter case labeled a “risk of ‘in terrorem’ settlements.”30 One would therefore expect the AT&T Mobility Court
to follow, or at least to distinguish explicitly, Shady Grove in its
analysis of whether classwide and bilateral dispute resolution are
so fundamentally different that class arbitration interferes with the
purposes of arbitration.31 It did not do so.
b. the road not taken
On the preemption question, then, the dissent has the better of
the argument: The FAA should not be interpreted to preempt
California’s neutral, generally applicable unconscionability doctrine. But that does not necessarily mean that the class-arbitration
waiver in this case should have been invalidated. Indeed, given
pragmatic concerns that I will address shortly, AT&T Mobility’s
waiver (but not all such waivers) should be enforceable. The problem is that once the issue was joined on preemption rather than
enforceability vel non, the majority seemed unable to refrain from
issuing broad pronouncements on preemption in general, and preemption of unconscionability doctrines in particular. But while the
majority might have been a bit more restrained, more of the fault
lies with the other side. The majority would not have addressed
preemption at all, but for the insistence of the plaintiffs’ lawyers,
the lower federal courts, and the dissenting Justices that the classarbitration waiver was unconscionable.32 It is that insistence, I
class action has more than an incidental effect on substantive rights, then Rule 23 might
be invalid. Regardless, the difference between class litigation and individual litigation
should be analyzed the same way in Shady Grove and Concepcion. For further discussion of
the limits on procedural rules, see note 68.
30

131 S Ct at 1752.

31

The late Professor Richard Nagareda suggested that Shady Grove supported reversal
of the Ninth Circuit. See Richard Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets
the Class Action, 86 Notre Dame L Rev 1069 (2011). His analysis, however, turns on his
assumption that California unconscionability law is based on a state law policy that seeks
to “confron[t] . . . the defendant with the full force of class-wide deterrence.” Id at 1121.
In Section IB, I take issue with that assumption.
32
Indeed, the plaintiffs explicitly urged the Supreme Court to “decline AT&T’s invitation” to decide the case on the basis of state law. Respondent’s Brief at *12. Although
ATTM did not explicitly ask the Supreme Court to rule on the state-law question, its
brief repeatedly denigrated the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of California unconscionability law as “a new rule,” a “wildly idiosyncratic interpretation,” “novel,” and a “plainly
discriminatory application of California’s unconscionability principles.” See Brief for Petitioner, AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion, No 09-893, 19, 36, 43 (S Ct, ﬁled Aug 2, 2010)
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contend, that constitutes the hubris (or the greediness for a big
win) that ultimately led to the majority’s broad ruling. We can
blame the majority for its poor legal analysis and the unnecessary
breadth of the opinion. But given the lawyers’ arguments, the
disastrous consequences of invalidating this class-arbitration
waiver clause (one of the most consumer-friendly such clauses
imaginable), and the Court’s previous strong support for arbitration generally, it was the dissenters who had the last clear chance
to rescue the situation.
Arguments about the preemptive effect of the FAA are only
relevant if the contract is in fact unconscionable under state law.
The plaintiffs claimed that it was, and both the district court and
the Court of Appeals explicitly agreed. The Supreme Court—
including the dissenters—took those courts’ word for it without
comment. Had they not, the result might have been very different,
because if the contract was not unconscionable there was no need
to decide any preemption questions. And an examination of the
context of the California Supreme Court decision in Discover Bank,
on which the lower courts relied, demonstrates that those courts
misapplied California law when they concluded that the ATTM
contract was unconscionable. The whole mess might have been
avoided if this issue and not the big win were the focus of the
case.
How should the issue have been more modestly framed and
resolved? Let us begin with basic unconscionability doctrine.
Courts considering previous generations of class-arbitration waivers had invalidated them as unconscionable because they were
exculpatory—they placed such onerous burdens on complaining
consumers that no individual consumer would ever seek arbitration, and thus the corporate defendants could engage in unlawful
conduct with impunity. The ﬁrst generation of class-arbitration
waivers were truly unconscionable, as “avaricious drafters included
terms that excluded punitive damages and incidental or conse(“Petitioner’s Brief”). Perhaps ATTM failed to make the state-law argument more explicit
because it, too, was greedily hoping for a broad federal-law win rather than a narrow
state-law one. But the potential downside for ATTM was much lower: Had the Court
rejected the preemption argument, ATTM could still have argued to other courts (both
state and federal) that its particular contract was not unconscionable; only in the Ninth
Circuit would that argument have been foreclosed. And, of course, California state courts
would not be bound by the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of California law, so ATTM
might have been able to undo even that damage. ATTM was therefore not risking as much
as the plaintiffs were by downplaying the state-law grounds for reversal.
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quential damages, prohibited attorneys fees, required the arbitration to proceed in a location far from the consumer’s home, required the consumer to pay half or sometimes all of the arbitration
fees, imposed mandatory conﬁdentiality clauses, or gave the drafter
the sole capability of selecting the arbitrator.”33
Responding to multiple courts’ invalidation of such contractual
terms as unconscionable,34 the second generation of class-arbitration waivers omitted all these punitive provisions and allowed consumers to bring individual claims at a relatively low cost. The
problem, however, was that imposing any monetary cost (in addition to the expenditure of the consumer’s time and energy)
served as a disincentive for consumers—or attorneys, even if their
fees would be paid—with very small claims. Recall that the Concepcions’ claim was for $30: No individual would be willing to
take that individual claim to arbitration if the only pay-out was
$30; and the award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party, without
some premium for the risk of losing, would be insufﬁcient to
motivate most attorneys. Some courts therefore held these secondgeneration waivers unconscionable as well.35
The California Supreme Court’s decision in Discover Bank addressed one of these second-generation waivers. The court explained the problem with such waivers, quoting Szetela v Discover
Bank:36
Fully aware that few customers will go to the time and trouble of suing
in small claims court, Discover has instead sought to create for itself
virtual immunity from class or representative actions despite their potential merit, while suffering no similar detriment to its own rights.
. . . The clause is not only harsh and unfair to Discover customers who
33
Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack? Exploring the Recent Judicial Skepticism
of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18
Cornell J L & Pub Pol 477, 503–04 (2009). Professor Lampley’s excellent article canvasses
the three generations of class arbitration waivers. For a history of the development of the
ﬁrst generation of waivers, see Gilles, 104 Mich L Rev at 396–99 (cited in note 3).
34
See Lampley, 18 Cornell J L & Pub Pol at 504 n 131 (cited in note 33); Gilles, 104
Mich L Rev at 399– 400 & n 136 (cited in note 3); Paul Carrington, Unconscionable Laywers,
19 Ga St U L Rev 361, 373–80 (2002).
35
In addition to Discover Bank, see, for example, Kristian v Comcast Corp., 446 F3d 25
(1st Cir 2006); Scott v Cingular Wireless, 161 P3d 1000 (Wash 2007); Kinkel v Cingular
Wireless LLC, 857 NE2d 250 (Ill 2006). See also Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding
Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive? 42 Wm & Mary L Rev 1,
80 (2000) (“no one has seriously suggested that arbitration ensures an economically viable
forum for persons with claims of ﬁve dollars, ten dollars, or even two hundred dollars
. . . [because] the minimum ﬁling fee will exceed the size of a small claim”).
36

97 Cal App 4th 1094, 1101, 118 Cal Rptr 2d 862, 867–68 (Cal App 2002).
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might be owed a relatively small sum of money, but it also serves as a
disincentive for Discover to avoid the type of conduct that might lead
to class action litigation in the ﬁrst place. . . . The potential for millions
of customers to be overcharged small amounts without an effective
method of redress cannot be ignored.37

This passage illustrates the problem with second-generation class
arbitration waivers: Very small claims, however meritorious, are
unlikely to be brought, and the bank is therefore free to engage
in unlawful conduct that makes millions of dollars for the bank
but that costs each consumer very little. As one commentator put
it, a class arbitration waiver of this kind allows businesses “to
engage in unchecked market misbehavior that results in small and
seemingly insigniﬁcant consequences upon individuals, but which
leads to sizeable windfalls for the particular corporation in the
aggregate.”38
The Discover Bank court, however, was careful to limit its holding: “We do not hold that all class action waivers are necessarily
unconscionable.” It invalidated only “waiver[s] . . . found in a
consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts
of damages . . . when it is alleged that the party with the superior
bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat
large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of
money.”39
Discover Bank, like the other cases invalidating second-generation waivers, also found no preemption.40 Because the unconscionability doctrine applied to all exculpatory contracts, not just
to arbitration clauses, the FAA savings clause protected it from
preemption. The fact that the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari in any of these earlier cases41 suggests that it was content
to allow the unconscionability doctrine and the FAA to coexist.
AT&T Mobility’s contract, however, was different. It contained
a third-generation arbitration clause. This clause did more than
simply require arbitration and waive classwide arbitration: It set
37

113 P3d at 1107–08.

38

J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements, 59 Vand L Rev 1735, 1747 (2006).
39

113 P3d at 1110.

40

Id at 1110 –17.

41

See Nagareda, 86 Notre Dame L Rev at 1106 (cited in note 31).
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up a complicated structure that was designed both to enable small
claims and to channel them into bilateral arbitration. Responding
to some of the problems with ﬁrst-generation waiver clauses, the
ATTM contract provided that ATTM would pay the cost of arbitration unless an arbitrator determined that the claim was frivolous; allowed consumers to choose arbitration in person (in the
consumer’s home county), by telephone, or through documentary
evidence; and allowed the arbitrator to award any remedy including injunctive relief, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees.42
More importantly, the ATTM contract also rectiﬁed the problems with second-generation waivers by offering premiums to successful consumers and their attorneys. It provided that if the arbitrator awarded more than ATTM’s last written settlement offer,
ATTM would pay the jurisdictional maximum of the small claims
court in the consumer’s jurisdiction—which in California is
$7,500—if that amount was larger than the arbitrator’s award.43
It also provided that if the arbitral award was larger than ATTM’s
last settlement offer, ATTM would pay double the attorneys’
fees.44 Finally, it provided for streamlined procedures, with relevant information and documents available on ATTM’s website.45
The district court concluded that the contractually mandated arbitration process was “quick, easy to use, and prompts full or, as
described by Plaintiffs, even excess payment to the customer without the need to arbitrate or litigate.”46
Such a clause is not exculpatory and therefore should not be
unconscionable under Discover Bank. The incentive structure gives
consumers a reason to pursue small individual claims and ATTM
a reason to settle such claims fairly. Even an individual consumer
with a small claim has an incentive to mail in the one-page Notice
of Dispute form that is posted on the ATTM website47 (which is
surely no more onerous than consulting an attorney to initiate a
class action). By ﬁling such a claim, the consumer can anticipate
42
See Laster v T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2008 WL 5216255 at *2–3 & n 2 (SD Cal Aug 11,
2008), aff ’d, Laster v AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F3d 849 (9th Cir 2009), rev’d, AT&T
Mobility v Concepcion, 131 S Ct 1740 (2011).
43

Id at *2.

44

Id.

45

Id at *3.

46

Id at *11.

47

Id at *3.
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either a prompt and reasonable settlement offer or a windfall if
an arbitrator ultimately ﬁnds the settlement offer inadequate. And
ATTM has every incentive to offer an appropriate amount in settlement, rather than insist on arbitration, in order to avoid the
penalties that attach if an arbitrator ultimately awards more than
the settlement offer.48 The waiver clause is thus not exculpatory
because it does not allow ATTM to “cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.”49
The Ninth Circuit essentially conceded that ATTM had an
incentive to settle all disputes for reasonable amounts. The problem, according to that court, was somewhat different:
The provision does essentially guarantee that the company will make
any aggrieved customer whole who ﬁles a claim. Although this is, in
and of itself, a good thing, the problem with it under California law—
as we read that law—is that not every aggrieved customer will ﬁle a
claim.50

Similarly, the district court was troubled by the premium provisions because they “prompt[ed] ATTM to accept liability, rather
than ‘escape liability,’ for small dollar claims.”51 In other words,
the problem was not that the contract created “a disincentive for
[defendant] to avoid the type of conduct that might lead to class
action litigation in the ﬁrst place,” but that it did not create sufﬁcient incentive to avoid that conduct because some aggrieved consumers might not ﬁle claims.
But think about the most likely reasons a consumer would not
ﬁle a claim: Either she concludes that the burden of ﬁling a claim
outweighs the harm she has suffered, or she is unaware that she
has suffered any harm at all. Given the ease of claim ﬁling under
the AT&T Mobility contract, the ﬁrst possibility seems unlikely.
Resting a ﬁnding of unconscionability on the second possibility
requires a conclusion that we ought to deter conduct that is not
48
Not only does ATTM have an incentive to offer an adequate settlement, but one
study suggests that a party making a written settlement offer is less likely to err in its
calculation of the ultimate worth of a claim as found by a court or an arbitrator. See
Randall L. Kiser, Martin A. Asher, and Blakely B. McShane, Let’s Not Make a Deal: An
Empirical Study of Decision Making in Unsuccessful Settlement Negotiations, 5 J Empirical Leg
Stud 551, 572–74 (2008).
49
Discover Bank, 113 P3d at 1110. Professor Lampley offered a similar analysis prior
to the AT&T Mobility litigation. See Lampley, 18 Cornell J L & Pub Pol at 513–17 (cited
in note 33).
50

Laster, 584 F3d at 856 n 9.

51

Laster, 2008 WL 5216255 at *10.
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perceived as harmful by the person it supposedly harms. While
that conclusion may be warranted in rare cases—perhaps where
the target is especially vulnerable—it seems a poor basis on which
to invalidate a broad range of consumer contracts. And under
either possibility, it seems contrary to our underlying principle of
litigant autonomy to argue that legal doctrines should entice people into litigation rather than simply removing any barriers that
inhibit them from suing.52
The AT&T Mobility contract is thus a far cry from the secondgeneration waivers found exculpatory in Discover Bank on the basis
that it would not be worthwhile for any aggrieved consumer to
pursue arbitration.53 The lower courts’ assumption that the availability of classwide resolution provides signiﬁcantly more deterrence thus ends up resting on the most likely monetary difference
between classwide and bilateral dispute resolution: the ratcheting
up of attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the settlement.54
But if a third-generation arbitration clause like that in the
ATTM contract is not exculpatory, why would a company include
one, and why would plaintiffs—or their lawyers—object? Understanding the answers to those questions might help explain why
the plaintiffs overreached. The key lies in the effect of aggregating
multiple individual claims into a single classwide suit or arbitration
proceeding.
There is great dispute about whether a “hydraulic pressure . . .
to settle”55 actually causes defendants to settle class actions for
more than they are worth on their merits.56 The most persuasive
52
This question also implicates the relationship between substance and procedure, which
is beyond the scope of this article. See note 68.
53
Professor Nagareda identiﬁed the crux of the difference as that between exculpation
and suboptimal deterrence, 86 Notre Dame L Rev at 1118–19 (cited in note 31). He
suggested that the lower courts in AT&T Mobility were implementing a state-law policy
in favor of “confronting . . . a defendant with the full force of class-wide deterrence,” and
that such a policy cannot trump federal law. Id at 1121. My argument is that state-law
policy, as enunciated in Discover Bank, does not in fact embody a preference for full-force
deterrence; the federal courts were mistaken in thinking that it did.
54

See text accompanying notes 67– 68.

55

Newton v Merrill Lynch, 259 F3d 154, 164 (3d Cir 2011).

56

Compare Henry Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 119–20 (Columbia,
1973) (aggregation “blackmails” defendants into settling); Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions:
Aggregation, Ampliﬁcation, and Distortion, 2003 U Chi Legal F 457 (examining distortion
effect of class actions); Alan S. Kaplinsky and Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me, but Who’s the
Predator: Banks Can Use Arbitration Clauses as a Defense, 7 Bus L Today 24 (May–June
1998) (“companies often feel pressured to pay substantial amounts in settlement for reasons
having nothing to do with the actual merits of the dispute”), with Charles Silver, “We’re
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argument that aggregation distorts settlement values is that it increases the variance, leading risk-averse defendants57 to settle even
low-probability or unmeritorious claims. Consider the situation
in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.,58 probably the most famous example of a judge declining to certify a class because of the likely
settlement pressure exerted by certiﬁcation. In Rhone-Poulenc,
Judge Posner estimated—based on prior individual trials—that
plaintiffs had approximately an 8 percent chance of prevailing.59
He noted a concern with “forcing these defendants to stake their
companies on the outcome of a single jury trial.”60 As Professor
Richard Nagareda has explained, Judge Posner was concerned
about the variance, or “ampliﬁcation effect” of aggregation.61 If
liability determinations were spread out over one thousand individual trials, the great likelihood was that the defendants would
indeed lose about 8 percent of the cases, and pay out 8 percent
of the claimed damages. Perhaps they would lose 5 percent or 15
percent, but the variance would still be small. If, instead, liability
was determined in a single class action, the defendants faced a 92
percent chance of paying nothing and an 8 percent chance of
having to pay 100 percent of the claimed damages. Although the
expected value is the same under both scenarios, the variance has
increased dramatically, and—given risk aversion—so has the presScared to Death”: Class Certiﬁcation and Blackmail, 78 NYU L Rev 1357 (2003) (suggesting
that class actions are rarely if ever inappropriately threatening); Bruce Hay and David
Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy,
75 Notre Dame L Rev 1377 (2000) (suggesting that few class actions are blackmail). See
also William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation? A Positive Externalities Theory of the
Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L Rev 709 (2006) (arguing aggregation and the
resulting settlement pressure causes positive externalities).
57
Defendants as a group tend to be more risk-seeking than risk-averse, see Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S Cal L Rev 113 (1996), but
the typical aggregation scenario makes them more risk-averse in two ways. First, the
uncertainty caused by a large variance induces defendants to behave in risk-averse fashion.
See Joseph A. Grundfest and Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real
Options Perspective, 58 Stan L Rev 1267 (2006). Second, risk-seeking defendants and riskaverse plaintiffs switch attitudes when confronting low-probability claims. See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U Chi L Rev 163 (2000). As
one scholar put it, “[r]isk aversion comes naturally to defendants facing mass litigation.”
Howard M. Erichson, Uncertainty and the Advantage of Collective Settlement, 60 DePaul L
Rev 627, 636 (2011).
58
59
60
61

51 F3d 1293 (7th Cir 1995).
Id at 1298.
Id at 1299.

Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, ClassWide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 Colum L Rev 1873, 1881–82 (2006).
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sure to settle.62 Aggregation, by increasing the risk to defendants,
increases their incentive to “ofﬂoad” that risk by offering a settlement that includes a premium.63
If aggregation (whether in litigation or arbitration) has this effect, we can understand why defendants would favor, and plaintiffs
would disfavor, waivers of classwide arbitration. But a waiver by
itself (that is, a typical second-generation arbitration clause) also
has the effect of excusing liability altogether. A second-generation
waiver, therefore, does not tell us whether the defendant is trying
to avoid liability altogether or simply to avoid being put in a
position where it might have to overcompensate plaintiffs for conceded liability.
That is where the third-generation arbitration clause comes in.
An arbitration clause like ATTM’s is designed—as the district
court noted—to cause the defendant to “accept liability” by making it easy for consumers to make claims and expensive for the
defendant to refuse to adequately compensate meritorious claimants. But at the same time, the clause precludes plaintiffs from
using the pressure of a class action to demand excessive compensation. The third-generation clause, especially as a development
after the invalidation of second-generation clauses, removes the
ambiguity about the defendant’s motives: Rather than trying to
avoid liability altogether, the defendant is simply trying to ensure
that plaintiffs will obtain only the compensation for which ATTM
is liable and not the overcompensation that might be extracted
based on the increase in variance.64
Another aspect of the distortive effect of aggregation provides
62
A second reason that aggregation increases the pressure to settle is that it simply
increases the likely number of claims. As several scholars have suggested, this is not a
valid argument against class treatment—if the claims are meritorious, we ought to encourage them and remove any barriers to ﬁling them. See, for example, Nagareda, 106
Colum L Rev at 1882–85 (cited in note 61); Silver, 78 NYU L Rev at 1365–69 (cited in
note 56). But see Andrew T. Berry, Comments on Aggregation: Some Unintended Consequences
of Aggregative Disposition Procedures, 31 Seton Hall L Rev 920, 921–22 (2001) (suggesting
that defendants are likely to settle large class actions for accounting reasons rather than
because of their likely liability).
63
See Richard Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pretrial as Trial in Complex Litigation,
60 DePaul L Rev 647, 668– 69 (2011); see also Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation
Risk, 76 U Chi L Rev 367 (2009).
64
Moreover, to the extent that showing unconscionability under Discover Bank requires
“a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers,” 113 P3d at 1110, the Concepcion class seems particularly ill-suited to claim unconscionability. After all, the tax
money that was collected on the “free” phone went straight to the state.
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a second insight into the ATTM arbitration clause. The conventional justiﬁcation for class actions for damages under Rule
23(b)(3)—as opposed to “limited fund” class actions under Rule
23(b)(1) or suits seeking injunctive or declaratory relief under Rule
23(b)(2)—is that it removes barriers to suit that would otherwise
exist for small, unmarketable claims.65 This justiﬁcation diminishes
or backﬁres when small claims are marketable. For example, when
the legislature has provided for minimum statutory damages in
order to ensure that plaintiffs with small actual damages will still
be likely to bring suit, a class action may be described as overkill.
One court described the issue as
aris[ing] from the effects of combining a statutory scheme that imposes
minimum statutory damages awards on a per-consumer basis—usually
in order to encourage the ﬁling of individual lawsuits as a means of
private enforcement of consumer protection laws—with the class action
mechanism that aggregates many claims—often because there would
otherwise be no incentive to bring an individual claim. Such a combination may expand the potential statutory damages so far beyond the
actual damages suffered that the statutory damages come to resemble
punitive damages—yet ones that are awarded as a matter of strict liability, rather than for the egregious conduct typically necessary to support a punitive damages award. It may be that the aggregation in a class
action of large numbers of statutory damages claims potentially distorts
the purpose of both statutory damages and class actions. If so, such a
distortion could create a potentially enormous aggregate recovery for
plaintiffs, and thus an in terrorem effect on defendants, which may
induce unfair settlements.66

The ATTM premium provisions—which give plaintiffs and their
attorneys incentives to ﬁle small claims—operate similarly to statutory damages provisions. And, analogously, the availability of
65
See, for example, Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 US 156, 161 (1974) (“Economic
reality dictates that [a suit involving a $70 claim] proceed as a class action or not at all.”);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v Shutts, 472 US 797, 809 (1985) (“Class actions . . . may permit
the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.”); Amchem Prods, Inc. v Windsor, 521 US 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very core of the
class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide
the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”).
66
Parker v Time Warner Entertainment Co., 331 F3d 13, 22 (2d Cir 2003). See also J.
Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement in Public Law, 53 Wm & Mary
L Rev 1137 (forthcoming 2012) (calling the combination of statutory damages and class
actions “remedial overkill”). As Professor Stephen Burbank put it in a posting on the Civil
Procedure Listserv, “most of the pain that opponents of the modern class action have felt
has been where, from the perspective of private enforcement, Rule 23 acts as a wild-card,
trans-substantively raising the stakes without regard to congruence with the goals of substantive law.”
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class arbitration magniﬁes the effect of the premiums. Thus a
third-generation arbitration clause, offering premiums but waiving
class arbitration, serves as choice between two alternative methods
of removing barriers for low-value claims. While consumers might
prefer one method over the other, inclusion of the premium provisions strongly suggests that the corporation is not attempting to
avoid liability.
Finally, even if the classwide nature of the dispute-resolution
process does not itself cause defendants to settle unmeritorious
claims, or to settle meritorious claims for more than their objective
worth, another aspect of class arbitration might. It is well known
that class actions—especially those involving small claims—are
driven less by the class members (even the named class representative) and more by entrepreneurial lawyers.67 Those lawyers, however, may reap signiﬁcantly greater fees from class actions than
they might from a series of individual suits, at least where the
claims are small. One scholar has suggested that in a large percentage of damages class actions, “attorneys [are] effectively the
sole beneﬁciaries.”68 It is therefore reasonable for a potential de67
For a classic description of this regime, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the
Plaintiff ’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum L Rev 669 (1986); see also John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efﬁciency in the Large
Class Action, 54 U Chi L Rev 877 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U Chi L Rev 1 (1991); Martin H. Redish, Class Actions,
Litigation Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 Cal L Rev 1573 (2007).
68
Martin H. Redish, Wholesale Justice: Constitutional Democracy and the Problem of the
Class Action Lawsuit 15 (Stanford, 2009). See also John H. Beisner, Matthew Shors, and
Jessica D. Miller, Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs? 57 Stan L
Rev 1441 (2005); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff,
60 L & Contemp Probs 167 (1997); Susan P. Koniak and George M. Cohen, Under Cloak
of Settlement, 82 Va L Rev 1051 (1996); Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 Notre
Dame L Rev 513 (2006); Charles Wolfram, Mass Torts—Messy Ethics, 80 Cornell L Rev
1228 (1995).
Some scholars have argued that despite the absence of beneﬁt to class members, class
actions are socially beneﬁcial because they “caus[e] the defendant-wrongdoer to internalize
the social costs of its actions.” Myriam Gilles and Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class
Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U Pa L Rev
103, 105 (2006); see also Brian Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little? 158
U Pa L Rev 2043 (2010) (suggesting that the deterrence value of class actions justiﬁes
higher fees for lawyers, especially when the class beneﬁts little). The problem with this
argument is the same one that underlies the Ninth Circuit’s misapplication of Discover
Bank: it assumes, controversially, that the measure of the validity of a procedural rule is its
deterrence value. See Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of
Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 Colum L Rev 1924, 1929 (2006) (“where is the authority to
promulgate a rule with the purpose . . . of enabling vigorous enforcement . . . ?”); Beisner,
Shors, and Miller, 57 Stan L Rev at 1442 (cited in note 68) (“if the true purpose of the
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fendant to wish to avoid classwide actions—including class arbitration—in order to avoid the large additional expense of attorneys’ fees. The ATTM contract, typical of third-generation
clauses, thus attempted to provide sufﬁcient incentive to attorneys
(by paying twice their fees) even in the absence of the more substantial class-action payoff.
In summary, the ATTM clause was almost certainly not exculpatory, and therefore should not have been found unconscionable.
By insisting that it was, the plaintiffs, the lower courts, and the
dissenting Justices forced the majority to confront the preemption
question. The result was a disastrously broad opinion that abrogated Discover Bank (and its equivalents) even for the second-generation clauses (and their equivalents). AT&T Mobility may even
be read by some courts to make harsh ﬁrst-generation clauses
enforceable, because the invalidity of such contracts rests on the
same general doctrine of unconscionability that the Court found
preempted by the FAA. The majority opinion thus serves as an
invitation for corporations to go back to contracts of adhesion that
are much less consumer friendly than the ATTM contract.
Was there any way to avoid this ﬁasco? If my analysis was correct, then there was a way at every stage in the litigation. The
simplest solution, of course, would have been for the plaintiffs’
lawyers to refrain from challenging ATTM’s class waiver—focusing instead on more exculpatory contracts—or for the lower federal courts to have found the waiver valid. But even at the Supreme
Court, the damage could have been minimized. The dissenting
Justices should have conceded that the Ninth Circuit erred in its
application of California law,69 rather than insisting that the clause
was invalid. That would have set up a reversal on narrow grounds,
and they might have attracted at least one more vote. We can’t
be sure, of course. But in other cases last Term, several Justices
in the AT&T Mobility majority refused to sign on to broad proclass concept were to facilitate private law enforcement” it would violate the Rules Enabling
Act, which “authorizes the federal judicial branch to create nothing more than purely
procedural mechanisms”). Even if we cannot sharply distinguish between substance and
procedure, we should place some limits on the substantive effects of rules of procedure.
See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv L Rev 693 (1974). A full discussion
is beyond the scope of this article, but wherever we draw the line, maximizing deterrence
seems to be on the substantive side. In any event, in most class actions, the primary
motivation of class counsel is to maximize fees, not achieve optimal deterrence. See Jay
Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 Tex L Rev 1137, 1170 (2009).
69
See Salve Regina College v Russell, 499 US 225 (1991) (holding appellate courts should
decide questions of state law de novo, with no deference to district court determination).
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nouncements, concurring only in the judgment because they preferred to rely on narrower grounds.70 Perhaps a similar approach
would have been attractive in this case—and, if the dissenting
Justices had been the ones proposing it, they would have put together a majority. In particular, Justice Thomas, who takes a very
dim view of what he calls “purposes-and-objectives” preemption,71
might have joined an opinion reversing the Ninth Circuit without
reaching the preemption question. It would then have been the
Justices urging broad preemption who would have been reduced
to writing nonprecedential concurrences.
The lawyers and judges who would settle for nothing short of
the invalidation of all arbitration waivers ended up with a decision
that arguably creates a regime prohibiting the invalidation of any.
Through their obduracy, they squandered the opportunity to cabin
the damage done by the majority’s broad preemption holding. That
was unconscionable.
II. Wal-Mart v Dukes
Wal-Mart differs from AT&T Mobility in a number of ways,
but it ultimately illustrates the same dangers of overreaching. The
Court was again correct in rejecting certiﬁcation of the Wal-Mart
class, but this time the majority’s reasoning was sound. In this
section, therefore, I begin not by criticizing the majority’s reasoning but by defending it, showing that the plaintiffs tried to
stretch existing doctrine too far. However, the majority opinion
contained some broad language and other potentially troublesome
aspects that may bear harmful fruit in future cases. And the dissenting opinion, by highlighting some of that language, increases
the probability that the case will be read broadly in the future. As
in AT&T Mobility, the plaintiffs and their sympathizers might have
70
See, for example, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v Nicastro, 131 S Ct 2780, 2793 (2011)
(Breyer, J, joined by Alito, J, concurring in judgment) (“this [case] is an unsuitable vehicle
for making broad pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional rules”); Ortiz v Jordan,
131 S Ct 884, 893 (2011) (Thomas, J, joined by Scalia, J, and Kennedy, J, concurring in
judgment) (“I would limit our decision to the question presented and remand for consideration of any additional issues.”).
71
See Wyeth, 129 S Ct at 1205, 1211–18 (Thomas, J, concurring in judgment); see also
AT&T Mobility, 131 S Ct at 1754 (Thomas, J, concurring). See also Gregory M. Dickinson,
An Empirical Study of Obstacle Preemption in the Supreme Court, 89 Neb L Rev 682 (2011)
(documenting Justice Thomas’s aversion to obstacle preemption).

22

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2011

limited the damage done by the decision if they had not been
greedy.
a. reaching too high: unconscious discrimination
The Wal-Mart plaintiffs were more sympathetic, but the overreaching by lawyers and judges had similar consequences. The
plaintiffs alleged that their employer, Wal-Mart, had violated Title
VII by discriminating against them on the basis of their gender
in salary and promotion decisions. Based on the afﬁdavits submitted in the case, it seems very likely that some female employees
were indeed discriminated against and could have prevailed in
individual suits against the company.
The overreaching in the case started at its very inception: Rather
than suing individually, Betty Dukes and several other Wal-Mart
employees brought a nationwide class action on behalf of 1.5 million current and former female employees. They alleged that the
company intentionally discriminated on the basis of gender. It did
so, they argued, by granting complete discretion to individual store
managers to make salary and promotion decisions and simultaneously creating a “corporate culture” of gender bias.
No class action of this magnitude had ever been certiﬁed. The
class consisted of a million and a half members, working at 3,400
stores, alleging discrimination by what the Court characterized as
“a kaleidoscope of supervisors (male and female), subject to a variety of regional policies that all differed.”72
Rule 23(a)(2) requires at least one “question[] of law or fact
common to the class” in order for certiﬁcation to be appropriate.
As both the majority and the dissent recognized, this requirement
really focuses on the common resolution of questions:
What matters to class certiﬁcation . . . is not the raising of common
“questions”—even in droves—but, rather the capacity of a classwide
proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of
the litigation.73
72
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v Dukes, 131 S Ct 2541, 2557 (2011), quoting Dukes v Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 603 F3d 571, 652 (9th Cir 2010) (Kozinski dissenting).
73
131 S Ct at 2551, quoting Richard Nagareda, Class Certiﬁcation in the Age of Aggregate
Proof, 84 NYU L Rev 97, 132 (2009) (emphasis in original). See also id at 2567 (Ginsburg,
J, dissenting): “Thus, a ‘question’ ‘common to the class’ must be a dispute, either of fact
or of law, the resolution of which will advance the determination of the class members’ claims”
(emphasis added).
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Because of the decentralized decision making by Wal-Mart managers, claims by members of the class would not share any common
answers to the question “why was I disfavored?”74 unless the plaintiffs could “provide a nexus between the subjective decision-making and discrimination.”75
The plaintiffs argued that the required nexus was a companywide policy of discrimination. But Wal-Mart had an ofﬁcial policy
against discrimination, imposed penalties for EEO violations, and
had won national diversity awards.76 Plaintiffs therefore had to
rely on a claim that despite Wal-Mart’s announced anti-discrimination policies, a “corporate culture” of gender bias existed, providing the glue that linked the disparate individual claims together.
The most signiﬁcant problem with the plaintiffs’ theory is that
there was insufﬁcient evidence that such a corporate culture—if
it existed—caused the discrimination against all, or even most, of
the members of the class. Without a common cause for the individual discriminatory acts, the plaintiff class lacked a common
question (or common answers).77 Plaintiffs attempted to show causation through the testimony of Dr. William Bielby, their sociological expert. Relying on the concept of “social frameworks,” Dr.
Bielby testiﬁed that Wal-Mart was “vulnerable” to gender bias78
and that gender stereotyping likely inﬂuenced many promotion
and salary decisions made by individual Wal-Mart managers.79
But Dr. Bielby’s testimony was insufﬁcient to show causation,
for two reasons. First, he conceded that gender stereotyping might
74

131 S Ct at 2552.

75

Dukes v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 FRD 137, 150 (ND Cal 2004), aff ’d in part and
rem’d in part, 603 F3d 571 (9th Cir 2010), rev’d Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v Dukes, 131 S Ct
2541 (2011).
76
See Wal-Mart, 131 S Ct at 2553 (policy, penalties); Dukes, 222 FRD at 154 (penalties,
awards).
77
Note that requiring plaintiffs to show causation is not equivalent to requiring them
to prove their case on the merits. To obtain class certiﬁcation, plaintiffs must “afﬁrmatively
demonstrate” compliance with Rule 23’s requirements, Wal-Mart, 131 S Ct at 2551, including the existence of a common question. Plaintiffs were relying on the theory of
corporate culture to weave together the individual acts of discrimination into a single
classwide common question. At the certiﬁcation stage, then, they did not need to prove
the existence of the corporate culture, but they did need to prove that the individual acts
alleged to be discriminatory arose from some common source, whether corporate culture
or something else. In other words, they had to show that corporate culture really was the
causative glue.
78

Dukes, 222 FRD at 154.

79

Id at 153.
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have inﬂuenced as few as half a percent of employment decisions
at Wal-Mart.80 The possibility that corporate culture motivated
such a small number of decisions deprived that culture of its status
as the link among the disparate individual acts of discrimination;
Dr. Bielby’s testimony therefore could not establish the existence
of a common question.
Dr. Bielby also misused the concept of social frameworks by
using general research ﬁndings to draw conclusions about a speciﬁc case.81 As described by one group of prominent social-framework scholars, Dr. Bielby “utilized no standardized cultural assessment tool, no employee surveys or interviews, nor any causal
testing” to conclude that “gender was a causal factor in some
unspeciﬁed percentage of all personnel decisions at all Wal-Mart
facilities across the USA.”82 Because his testimony was based on
general research rather than on an examination of Wal-Mart or
its employees, it could not demonstrate a causal link between corporate culture and any individual employment decision. Such a
link cannot be assumed: There is research suggesting that implicit
bias (in other words, individual internalization of a discriminatory
corporate culture) does not predict discriminatory behavior.83
Once we strip away Dr. Bielby’s testimony, the Wal-Mart plaintiffs are left with anecdotal evidence of individual instances of
discrimination, and statistics that arguably demonstrate that
women were paid less and promoted less frequently than men.
Neither sufﬁces to demonstrate the “common question” required
for class certiﬁcation.
As the majority noted, the anecdotal evidence was “too weak to
raise any inference that all the individual, discretionary personnel
80
Dukes v Wal-Mart, 222 FRD 189, 192 (ND Cal 2004) (ruling on motion to strike
expert testimony).
81
See John Monahan, Laurens Walker, and Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of
Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance of “Social Frameworks,” 94 Va L Rev 1715 (2008).
This essay, two of whose authors were the only sources relied on by Bielby in his analysis,
speciﬁcally criticizes his testimony in this case. See id at 1716. The same authors in a
later article assert that “expert opinions” that rely on “general scientiﬁc evidence to make
case-speciﬁc descriptive and causal claims . . . lack legal or scientiﬁc justiﬁcations.” John
Monahan, Laurens Walker, and Gregory Mitchell, The Limits of Social Framework Evidence,
8 L Prob & Risk 307, 309 (2009).
82
83

Monahan, Walker, and Mitchell, 8 L Prob & Risk at 312 (cited in note 81).

See Gregory Mitchell and Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of
Mindreading, 67 Ohio St L J 1023, 1033–34, 1065–72; Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating
Mind: Deﬁne It, Prove It, 40 Conn L Rev 979, 984–85 (2008); Amy Wax, Discrimination
as Accident, 74 Ind L J 1129, 1139– 42 (1999).
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decisions are discriminatory.”84 The dissent’s contrary view of the
anecdotal evidence suffered from one of the same problems that
plagued Dr. Bielby’s testimony. The dissenting Justices asserted
that the anecdotal evidence “suggest[ed] that gender bias suffused
Wal-Mart’s company culture.”85 But even if that is true, there was
no evidence that a discriminatory culture caused all—or even
any—of the allegedly discriminatory employment decisions. The
whole notion of a discriminatory company culture depends on an
unjustiﬁed assumption that anyone immersed in a particular cultural milieu will necessarily respond to it in the same discriminatory manner. Without that unjustiﬁed assumption, there is no
question common to all class members: Each class member is
alleging an individual act of discrimination that might have occurred with or without a biased corporate culture.
Plaintiffs also introduced statistical evidence in the form of regression analyses. Holding other variables constant, plaintiffs’
expert found statistically signiﬁcant differences between men and
women in both salary and promotion levels.86 If there were nothing
else to explain those differences, it might be plausible to conclude
that company-wide gender discrimination caused them.87 But there
was something else, something much more likely than intentional
discrimination by Wal-Mart. The disparities at Wal-Mart closely
mirrored nationwide salary and promotion disparities.88 As one
commentator put it:
One might say that if Wal-Mart were indeed discriminating . . . then
its execution of that enterprise was startlingly inept. If a highly organized, national employer really intended to keep down its female hourly
84

131 S Ct at 2556.

85

Id at 2563 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting). The dissent also accused the majority of requiring
a speciﬁed number of anecdotes. Id at 2564 n 4. To be fair, while the majority mentions
the lack of a causal link, it focuses on the number of anecdotes and also asserts that “a
few anecdotes selected from literally millions of employment decisions prove nothing at
all.” 131 S Ct at 2556 & n 9.
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See id at 2555; see also id at 2564 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).
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There are still some problems with that conclusion. The majority and the dissent
disagreed about whether the statistical analyses demonstrated disparities within stores. See
131 S Ct at 2555 (majority); id at 2564 n 5 (dissent) (labeling it an “arcane disagreement
about statistical method”). More fundamentally, regression analysis is a ﬂawed technique—
despite its almost universal judicial acceptance—for demonstrating intentional discrimination, because it shows only a correlation between a chosen set of variables rather than
whether changes in one variable cause changes in the other. See D. James Greiner, Causal
Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 Harv L Rev 534 (2008).
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See Nagareda, 84 NYU L Rev at 154–55 (cited in note 73).
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employees, then one would think that it could manage to become more
than just a “conduit” for broader labor-market characteristics.89

The statistical evidence shows only that Wal-Mart behaved no
differently than most American employers. There was no showing
that the disparities were caused by a unique corporate culture at
Wal-Mart rather than by whatever caused the broad labor-market
disparities in general. Again, this is not to say that Wal-Mart
supervisors did not discriminate, but only that the statistical evidence is not enough to demonstrate the company-wide policy of
discrimination that is the necessary predicate for the court to ﬁnd
a common question.
It is important to remember that, as in AT&T Mobility, the
plaintiffs in Wal-Mart had an economically and legally viable alternative to a class action suit. With strong evidence that individuals were the victims of intentional discrimination, signiﬁcant
back-pay awards at stake, and attorneys’ fees available in all except
frivolous cases, individual suits under Title VII were marketable.
Some plaintiffs might also have been able to bring smaller class
actions focused on particular regions or particular employment
opportunities.90 Instead, they tried to combine all possible claims
into a single class action.
Why might they have taken that risky approach? I suggest that
just as the insistence on unconscionability in AT&T Mobility rested
(at least in part) on a desire to insert deterrence concerns into
Rule 23, the seemingly incomprehensible decision to proceed as
a class action in Wal-Mart can be explained as a desire to change
the substantive law of employment discrimination. The allegation
of a culture of discrimination was essentially an attempt to write
into Title VII the concepts of structural discrimination and implicit bias.91 Some scholars have been urging this approach for
over two decades, beginning with Charles Lawrence’s seminal article in 1987.92 These scholars argue that even as overt, conscious
89

Id at 155.
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Indeed, plaintiffs’ attorneys recently ﬁled a much smaller class action in California
federal court on behalf of about 90,000 women in four regions in California and neighboring states. See Andrew Martin, Female Wal-Mart Employees File New Bias Case, New
York Times (Oct 27, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/business/
women-ﬁle-new-class-action-bias-case-against-wal-mart.html?scpp1&sqp&stpnyt.
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See Nagareda, 84 NYU L Rev at 152–62 (cited in note 73).

Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan L Rev 317 (1987).
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discrimination is fading, implicit bias continues unabated. Unconscious discrimination is so pervasive that it is woven into the
structure of institutions, the theory goes, and if we do not restructure discrimination law to make it legally actionable we will
make no progress against the persistence of discrimination.93 One
commentator describes this scholarship in language that almost
mirrors the Wal-Mart plaintiffs’ claims: Disparities in wages and
promotions continue to exist “because workplace structures facilitate conduct—often driven by subtle or unconscious bias—that
operates as a drag on the achievements” of women and minorities.94
But such a theory distorts Title VII beyond recognition. It is
one thing to allege that a particular individual has unconsciously
discriminated (that is, that he has acted out of an unrecognized
prejudice), but quite another to argue—as the Wal-Mart plaintiffs’
theory does—that the entire workplace culture is infected with
unrecognized bias. Such an argument moves Title VII from a
prohibition against intentional discrimination to a prohibition
against a workforce that does not “look like America.”95
The idea of implicit bias has remained controversial within the
academy and has never made any headway outside it. Indeed, there
is no credible scientiﬁc evidence to support the existence of the
alleged widespread unconscious discrimination that purportedly
93
See, for example, Virginia Valian, Why So Slow? The Advancement of Women (MIT,
1998); Patrick S. Shin, Liability for Unconscious Discrimination? A Thought Experiment in the
Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 Hastings L J 67 (2010); Ivan E. Bodensteiner,
The Implications of Psychological Research Related to Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit
Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 Mo L Rev 83 (2008); Tristin K. Green, A
Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 Vand L Rev
849 (2007); Audrey J. Lee, Note, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 40 Harv CR-CL L Rev 481 (2005); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum L Rev 458 (2001); Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan L Rev 1161 (1995).
94
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94
Cal L Rev 1, 2 (2006). Compare this to the “basic theory” of the plaintiffs’ case in WalMart: “a strong and uniform ‘corporate culture’ permits bias against women to infect,
perhaps subconsciously, the discretionary decisionmaking of each one of Wal-Mart’s
thousands of managers.” 131 S Ct at 2548.
95
Even scholars who support the concept of structural discrimination ﬁnd it inconsistent
with current law. Professor Samuel Bagenstos, who believes that there is implicit bias and
“ﬁnd[s] the case for a structural approach to employment discrimination law . . . compelling” nevertheless recognizes that remedying the structural inequalities that result from
implicit bias is inconsistent with “the generally accepted normative underpinnings of antidiscrimination law.” Bagenstos, 94 Cal L Rev at 3 (cited in note 94); see also Wax, 74
Ind L J at 1146–52 (cited in note 83).
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results in structural discrimination.96 The Wal-Mart class action
can nevertheless be seen as an attempt to turn implicit bias theory
into explicit law. Bringing a class action in order to rewrite the
substantive law of employment discrimination to include implicit
bias and structural discrimination was thus overreaching at its
worst.
b. the harm of overreaching and overwriting
As in AT&T Mobility, the strategy backﬁred. Overreaching by
the plaintiffs and the dissenters led to a majority opinion that was
broader and more harmful than a simple rejection of class certiﬁcation would have been. Had the majority crafted a narrower
opinion, the repercussions for future class actions would have been
less signiﬁcant. In short, if a lower court or a unanimous Supreme
Court had held that class certiﬁcation was inappropriate under
Rule 23(a),97 the accompanying opinion might have been quite
different. Four aspects of the majority opinion are particularly
noteworthy.
First, the majority opinion can be interpreted as ratcheting up
the requirements for class certiﬁcation. The Wal-Mart suit was
brought under Rule 23(b)(2), which meant that it—like all class
actions—had to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a), but not the
more demanding requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). While Rule
23(a)(2) requires only a single common question, Rule 23(b)(3)
requires that the common questions predominate over individual
ones. The dissent accused the majority of conﬂating the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) with the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).98 By blending the two, the dissent
charged, the majority “elevate[d] the (a)(2) inquiry so that it is no
longer ‘easily satisﬁed.’”99
96
For a thorough discrediting of the purported “evidence” for the pervasiveness of
unconscious discrimination, see Mitchell and Tetlock, 67 Ohio St L J (cited in note 83);
Hal R. Arkes and Philip E. Tetlock, Attributions of Implicit Prejudice, or “Would Jesse Jackson
‘Fail’ the Implicit Association Test?” 15 Psychol Inquiry 257 (2004).
97
In Wal-Mart, the majority and the dissent agreed that the class was improperly certiﬁed
under Rule 23(b)(2) for reasons irrelevant to my arguments. See 131 S Ct at 2557–61
(majority); id at 2561–62 (dissent). They disagreed over whether the suit met the commonality requirements of Rule 23(a).
98
99

Id at 2561–62, 2565–66 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).

Id at 2565 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting), quoting John W. Moore, et al, 5 Moore’s Federal
Practice § 23.23[2] at 23–72 (Matthew Bender, 3d ed 2011).
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The dissenters were both right and wrong. They were wrong
in contending that the majority conﬂated the requirements of
23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3)—as the majority concluded, there was simply
not enough evidence of even a single common question. But the
intuition that the majority might be performing some kind of
alchemy on the 23(a)(2) commonality requirement, “elevat[ing]”
it beyond previous incarnations, is supported by language in the
majority opinion. Most troubling is the majority’s assertion that
the plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of a common question
because they provided “no convincing proof ” of a company-wide
discriminatory policy.100 Similarly, the majority rejected the statistical evidence as “insufﬁcient to establish that respondents’ theory can be proved on a classwide basis.”101 These statements might
be read to suggest that plaintiffs seeking class certiﬁcation must
come very close to proving their case on the merits.102
The majority rightly asserted that the precedents require a “rigorous analysis” to determine whether a plaintiff seeking class certiﬁcation has demonstrated actual compliance with the requirements of Rule 23.103 As the majority also noted, “[f]requently, that
‘rigorous analysis’ will entail some overlap with the merits of the
plaintiff ’s underlying claim.”104 But there is a line, however ﬁne,
between that “rigorous analysis” and actual proof of the merits of
the case. The language about “convincing proof ” creates some
ambiguity about where that line lies. Lower courts—or the Supreme Court in a future case—might use the language to impose
a higher burden and deny certiﬁcation even in cases with stronger
100

131 S Ct at 2556 (emphasis added).

101

Id at 2555 (emphasis added).
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Lower courts had already recognized—and the Court in Wal-Mart conﬁrmed—that
a plaintiff seeking certiﬁcation must demonstrate satisfaction of the relevant Rule 23
requirements, even if that necessitates some review of the merits. See, for example, In re:
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F3d 305 (3d Cir 2008); In re Initial Public
Offerings Securities Litigation, 471 F3d 24 (2d Cir 2006). But the Court’s language in WalMart seems to raise the standard even higher.
103

131 S Ct at 2551. The dissent does not appear to disagree.
Id. Again, the dissent makes no comment. Despite some confounding language in
Eisen v Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 US 156, 177 (1974), which the Wal-Mart Court labeled
as “the purest dictum,” 131 S Ct at 2552 n 6, lower courts had already reached this
conclusion. See Wal-Mart, 603 F3d at 581–86; Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F3d at 309; Oscar
Private Equity Investments v Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F3d 261, 268 (5th Cir 2007); In
re Initial Public Offerings Securities Litigation, 471 F3d 24, 33 (2d Cir 2006); Gariety v Grant
Thornton, LLP, 368 F3d 356, 366 (4th Cir 2004); Szabo v Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249
F3d 672, 676 (7th Cir 2001).
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evidence than the Wal-Mart plaintiffs provided. The dissent’s
claim that the majority elevated the burden might become a selffulﬁlling prophecy, even though the dissent misidentiﬁed the
source of the problem.
The second troubling aspect of the majority opinion is its treatment of the anecdotal evidence. As I noted earlier, the majority
found the anecdotal evidence too weak to create a causal inference.
But in support of that conclusion, the majority focused not on the
absence of any linkage between the allegedly discriminatory culture and the individual employment decisions, but instead on the
small number of anecdotes and the fact that they were from stores
in a small number of states.105 Again, then, the dissenters had some
justiﬁcation for their accusation that the majority created a “numerical ﬂoor before anecdotal evidence can be taken into account.”106 And both the majority’s focus on the number of anecdotes and the dissent’s accusation might lead to later decisions
citing Wal-Mart for the proposition that there is a numerical ﬂoor.
Two ﬁnal issues arise in Part III of the majority opinion, in
which all nine Justices joined and which concluded that this particular lawsuit should not have been certiﬁed under Rule 23(b)(2).
Here, too, the analysis is broader than it needs to be, again suggesting that the plaintiffs’ overreaching produced disastrous results.
The Court ﬁrst suggested that the “procedural protections” of
Rule 23(b)(3)—including the right to opt out—are constitutionally
required by the Due Process Clause under Phillips Petroleum Co.
v Shutts,107 at least in suits predominantly seeking damages.108 But
that is not the holding of Shutts, which involved complicated personal-jurisdiction issues intertwined with the class certiﬁcation
question. As a number of commentators have noted, reading the
opt-out provision as constitutionally required is an “extreme reading” of Shutts.109 In reading Shutts to constitutionalize the opt-out
105

See text accompanying notes 84 –85.
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131 S Ct at 2563 n 4 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).
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472 US 797 (1985).
See 131 S Ct at 2559: “In the context of a class action predominantly for money
damages we have held that absence of notice and opt-out violates due process. See [Shutts].”
108

109
Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 Ind L J 597, 605– 06
(1987). See also Redish, Wholesale Justice at 158 (cited in note 68); Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U
Pa L Rev 2035, 2076–109 (2008); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and
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requirement, the Wal-Mart Court elided the difference between
constitutional requirements and those derived from rules or statutes, a form of “intellectual slippage” that narrows the authority
of the legislature.110 Should Congress at some time in the future
wish to expand the reach of mandatory class actions, Wal-Mart’s
interpretation of Shutts will stand in the way.
Finally, in addressing the inappropriateness of certiﬁcation under Rule 23(b)(2), the Court considered the Ninth Circuit’s solution to the problem that Wal-Mart might have individual defenses to claims by some class members. Even if plaintiffs could
establish a pattern or practice of discrimination, the Court noted,
not every class member would be entitled to damages—Wal-Mart
might be able to “show that it took an adverse employment action
against an employee for [a] reason other than discrimination.”111
The Court of Appeals, recognizing this possibility, suggested that
the district court could allow Wal-Mart “to present individual defenses in . . . randomly selected ‘sample cases,’ thus revealing the
approximate percentage of class members whose unequal pay or
nonpromotion was due to something other than gender discrimination.”112 The court could then “extrapolat[e] the validity and
value of the untested claims from the sample set.”113
In one short paragraph, the Supreme Court “disapprove[d] that
novel project,” calling it “Trial by Formula.”114 But such statistical
sampling is not as novel as the Court would have it, nor is it
necessarily inappropriate. Statistical sampling of various sorts, including both survey evidence and bellwether trials, has been used
Client, 73 Notre Dame L Rev 913, 954 –55 (1998); Arthur R. Miller and David J. Crump,
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
96 Yale L J 1, 31–32 (1986). Cf. Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion
Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 Colum L Rev 1148, 1166 (1998) (“Shutts is
about due process limitations on state court in personam jurisdiction over absent, nonresident
class ‘plaintiffs’”) (emphasis added); Patrick Woolley, Collateral Attack and the Role of Adequate Representation in Class Suits for Money Damages, 58 U Kan L Rev 918, 971–75 (2010)
(agreeing with Monaghan).
110
The notion of “intellectual slippage” of this sort was ﬁrst suggested in David E.
Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 Yale L J 1584, 1589 (2009).
111
131 S Ct at 2560– 61. It is ironic that the dissenting Justices joined this portion of
the opinion. By suggesting that not every pay or promotion decision was tainted by discrimination, the Court is essentially reiterating that plaintiffs have shown an insufﬁcient
causal link between a hypothetical company-wide policy and the harms to class members.
112
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in a few legal contexts.115 A number of commentators have explained its value (in allowing the accurate resolution of cases that
could not otherwise be resolved because of scarcity of judicial
resources) and demonstrated how it can be consistent with the
Constitution and with our litigation regime.116 Indeed, to the extent that statistical sampling is problematic at all, it is problematic
for plaintiffs: While it produces an amount of damages that is
accurate overall, it may distribute those damages in a less than
perfect fashion.117 No commentator has suggested that defendants
have any ground to object to sampling. In addition, the question
of the validity of statistical sampling as a technique for resolving
large-scale disputes necessarily prompts a comparison to other
techniques; at least in some contexts, empirical research has shown
that traditional trials often do not provide the beneﬁts thought to
ﬂow from individualized adjudication.118 In a world of increasingly
globalized harm and limited judicial resources, sampling might
ultimately serve the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants.
The Court considered none of this information in concluding
that statistical sampling violated the Rules Enabling Act. Nor did
it consider whether such a ruling might be premature. The use
of statistical sampling in the context of class actions is still in its
infancy. In the scientiﬁc context, it took decades for statistical
115
See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F Supp 1460 (D Hawaii 1995),
aff ’d, Hilao v Estate of Marcos, 103 F3d 767 (9th Cir 1996); Cimino v Raymark Industries,
Inc., 751 F Supp 649 (ED Tex 1990), rev’d, 151 F3d 297 (5th Cir 1998). See also Laurens
Walker and John Monahan, Sampling Damages, 83 Iowa L Rev 545, 559– 60 (1998) (documenting uncontroversial use of surveys—a form of sampling—in trademark cases since
1963).
116
See, for example, Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 Tex L Rev
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstractp1945514; Alexandra D. Lahav,
Bellwether Trials, 76 Geo Wash L Rev 576 (2008); Laurens Walker and John Monahan,
Sampling Evidence at the Crossroads, 80 S Cal L Rev 969 (2007); Laurens Walker and John
Monahan, Sampling Liability, 85 Va L Rev 329 (1999); Walker and Monahan, 83 Iowa L
Rev 545 (cited in note 115); Michael J. Saks and Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved:
The Unrecognized Beneﬁts of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 Stan L
Rev 815 (1992); Christopher J. Roche, Note, A Litigation Association Model to Aggregate
Mass Tort Claims for Adjudication, 91 Va L Rev 1463 (2005). The dispute about statistical
sampling and bellwether trials may be viewed as one facet of the larger argument between
those who insist on individual autonomy and those who favor collective justice. See generally David Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 Notre Dame L Rev
913 (1998). The authorities cited in this note argue, however, that statistical sampling also
serves the interests of individual plaintiffs.
117
See Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of
Process Scarcity, 46 Vand L Rev 561, 572–73 (1993).
118
See Deborah Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U Ill L
Rev 89 (1989).
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sampling to move from “early controversy” to “decisive acceptance.”119 Had statistical sampling in the law survived beyond WalMart, it might have proven similarly enduring—but the majority’s
“disapproval” ensured that we will never know.
Wal-Mart and AT&T Mobility are thus similar in that the majority opinions may well have detrimental effects in the future.
They differ, however, in the extent to which different choices by
the dissent might have changed the jurisprudential landscape. Of
course, in both cases the majority opinion would not have been
written had the plaintiffs’ lawyers not brought the class action in
the ﬁrst place, or had the lower courts rejected the plaintiffs’
arguments. In AT&T Mobility, it also seems quite likely that if the
dissenting Justices had urged reversal on the ground that the Ninth
Circuit misapplied California law, that view would have attracted
a majority and the Court—or at least the majority opinion—would
never have reached the preemption question.
As to Wal-Mart, however, my argument is that the dissenting
Justices should have agreed with the majority’s reasoning. How
might that have cabined the troubling aspects of the majority opinion? For the two ﬁnal issues, which arose in the context of the
Rule 23(b)(2) requirements, the answer is straightforward. A court
should ﬁrst determine that the general requirements of Rule 23(a)
are met, before moving on to the more speciﬁc requirements of
the various subsections of Rule 23(b). The discussion of 23(b)(2)
was therefore technically unnecessary, but in the circumstances of
the actual case it was hard to avoid because the failure to satisfy
(b)(2) was the reason that the dissenting Justices concurred in the
judgment. Had the dissenting Justices instead agreed that the
lower court should be reversed because of the lack of the common
question required by Rule 23(a)(2), the Court would have been
much less likely to go out of its way to reach the (b)(2) issue. In
particular, as I noted with regard to AT&T Mobility, some of the
Justices in the majority are inclined to rule narrowly.120 While
Justice Scalia might have convinced them that addressing the (b)(2)
question was appropriate given actual Justices’ votes, it seems likely
that if there had been unanimity with regard to Rule 23(a), some119
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one would have raised the question of whether it was appropriate
to go beyond that issue.
For the troublesome language regarding “proof ” and the creation of ambiguity regarding a numerical ﬂoor for anecdotes, I
suggest that had the dissenting Justices not been so eager to discredit the majority’s reasoning, they might have been better able
to focus on the particular language. And that focus might have
produced either of two results. First, Justice Scalia, as author of
the opinion, might have been willing to tweak the language of the
opinion at the request of Justices joining it, especially if doing so
would allow the Court to issue a unanimous or nearly unanimous
opinion.121 Second, even had the language remained in the opinion, the Justices who objected to it could have written a concurring
opinion stressing the narrowness of the majority’s holding instead
of a dissenting opinion highlighting its potential breadth. Later
interpreters—including both lower court judges and the Court
itself in subsequent cases—looking for help in parsing the majority’s language would be led to interpret it narrowly rather than
broadly.
Language matters. There is a danger that future cases building
on the Wal-Mart precedent will engage in the same kind of expansive interpretation as occurred between Bell Atlantic Corp. v
Twombly122 and Ashcroft v Iqbal.123 The “plausibility” language of
Twombly124—arguably appropriate in the circumstances of that
case, but not well thought out—took on a life of its own in Iqbal.
Dismissing the complaint in Twombly could be justiﬁed on the
ground that an inference that defendants had acted unlawfully was
not only not “plausible,” but decidedly implausible.125 But in Iqbal,
121
The Court beneﬁts from—and therefore is likely to try to achieve—unanimity or
near-unanimity, especially in controversial cases. See, for example, Howard Gillman, The
Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive Institutionalism and the Analysis of
Supreme Court Decision-Making, in Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman, eds, Supreme
Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches 65, 81 (Chicago 1999); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv L Rev 802, 804 (1982); Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Signiﬁcance of Neutral Principles, 78 Colum L Rev 982, 1007 (1978).
122

550 US 544 (2007).
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129 S Ct 1937 (2009).
In Twombly, the majority opinion used “plausible,” “plausibly,” or “plausibility” sixteen
times to describe the standard for withstanding a motion to dismiss. See 550 US at 556
& n 4, 557 & n 5, 558, 559, 560, 564, 566, 569 & n 14, 570.
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the Court moved from requiring plaintiffs to show that an inference of illegality is not implausible to requiring them to show that
an inference of illegality is more likely than not. It seems clear
from the fact that Justice Souter, the author of Twombly, was in
dissent in Iqbal that this was not what (at least some members) of
the Court meant by invoking a plausibility standard. But “more
likely than not” is one reasonable interpretation of “plausible.”126
Had Justice Souter chosen his language more carefully in Twombly,
the Court might have had a more difﬁcult time concluding that
Iqbal’s complaint should have been dismissed.
The majority’s language in Wal-Mart has the potential to work
the same mischief. As in Twombly, the application of that language
to the facts of the particular case is not problematic. But there is
a danger that the language of “convincing proof ” and “a few anecdotes selected from literally millions” might preclude certiﬁcation in a case in which there is some (but not “convincing”)
evidence of a common question or a few more anecdotes. Such a
consequence—potentially avoidable had the dissenting Justices
agreed with the majority, focused on the language, and either
exerted pressure to change it or written a concurrence minimizing
its signiﬁcance—is made even more likely by the fact that the
dissent characterized it as making certiﬁcation harder to obtain.
As in AT&T Mobility, then, the lawyers and judges who wanted
to have it all ended up with nothing. And in the process, they
opened the door to a potential contraction of liability in future
cases.
III. The Need for Judicial Vigilance
Two dangers inhere in Rule 23, one recognized and one
hidden. The recognized danger is that plaintiffs’ counsel—especially in class actions and other aggregated cases—often have both
the opportunity and the incentive to favor their own interests at
the expense of their clients’ interests; various scholars have identiﬁed that danger and proposed solutions.127
Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 Wash U J L & Pol 61, 84 –
90 (2007).
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One deﬁnition of “plausible” is: “Of an argument, an idea, a statement, etc.: seeming
reasonable, probable, or truthful; convincing, believable.” Oxford English Dictionary, online at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/145466?redirectedFrompplausible#eid (deﬁnition 4a).
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But as Wal-Mart and AT&T Mobility illustrate, the problem goes
much deeper than the relationship between lawyers and clients.
The further danger hidden in Rule 23 is that in class actions,
much more than in individual cases, the ability of plaintiffs’ counsel
to frame the legal issues puts tremendous power into the hands
of private attorneys general who owe no duty to the general public
or to subsequent plaintiffs. Class actions, both because of their
scope and because they are so often high proﬁle, offer repeatplayer plaintiffs’ lawyers a tempting opportunity to try to shape
the law rather than simply to win a judgment. If class-action lawyers cannot always be counted on to put their own clients’ interests
ﬁrst, how can we expect them to worry about the interests of those
who are not even clients? Lawyers in this situation thus have an
enormous incentive to overframe (and overargue) the legal issues
and go for the big win—for both themselves and their existing
clients. Ultimately, though, when the hogs get slaughtered, it is
future plaintiffs who pay the price. The biggest losers in AT&T
Mobility and Wal-Mart were not the class members, who deserved
to lose on their particular claims, but consumers and employees
who might wish to bring class actions in the future.
The real tragedy of AT&T Mobility and Wal-Mart is not that
the plaintiffs’ lawyers overreached, it is that the Ninth Circuit and
the dissenting Justices took the bait and bought into the overframing of the issues. Had they been more focused on the narrow
procedural questions and less dazzled by the lawyers’ grandiose
claims, they might have reached different conclusions.
These two cases also suggest a solution to this inherent danger
of Rule 23, one that does not require rewriting the rule or tinkering with doctrine. Instead, judges need only be alert to the
danger and take steps to avert it.128 The courts should serve as a
safeguard against lawyers’ short-sighted strategic decisions, not
act in complicity with them. Just as courts are vigilant in moniM. Erichson and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent versus Closure, 96 Cornell L Rev 265
(2011). The core problem is that the development of an entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ bar
ends up replicating, as between lawyer and client (or potential client), the conﬂicts between
repeat-player “haves” and one-shot “have-nots” that Professor Marc Galanter identiﬁed
a generation ago. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L & Soc Rev 95 (1974). On the replication at the lawyer-client
level, see John Fabian Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Private Bureaucratic
Legalism and the Governance of the Tort System, 56 DePaul L Rev 261 (2007).
128
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litigation experience as lawyers or trial judges. See Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without Experience: The Problem of Federal Appellate Courts, 82 Notre Dame L Rev 97 (2006).
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toring legislative or administrative aggrandizement, they should
protect the system as a whole from overreaching by lawyers whose
loyalties lie elsewhere.
IV. Conclusion
More than a decade ago, Professor William Rubenstein
warned of the potential conﬂicts arising out of simultaneous civil
rights litigation by “professional public interest litigators” and
“occasional pro bono attorneys.”129 The problem is that the latter—unaware of or indifferent to the big picture—might bring
weak or badly timed cases that establish bad precedent for other
similarly situated litigants. In AT&T Mobility and Wal-Mart, we
see this scenario writ large. Rather than a conﬂict between two
sets of litigators, it is a conﬂict between a powerful plaintiffs’ bar
and the mass of ordinary consumers and employees.
But the real culprits in these cases were the lower court judges
and dissenting Justices. In a context in which both parties had
incentives to distort the issues, these judges abdicated their responsibility to frame the issues objectively. Accepting the plaintiffs’
claims at face value, they backed a player who was overplaying his
hand—and consequently failed to notice the powerhouse across
the table. Faced with weak arguments in novel cases with obviously
far-reaching consequences, they should have folded instead of betting someone else’s ranch.

129
William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members
and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 Yale L J 1623, 1632 (1997).

